

August 2020
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Strategy: Alternatives/Unconstrained Fixed-Income
Return (since Aug 2017): 7.64% gross / 5.79% net

Objective: An absolute return fixed-income strategy focused on exploiting long and short mispricings in credit markets that targets high-yield like returns above the midpoint of the US Fed Funds Target Range plus 4% to 6% p.a. over rolling 3 year periods with volatility of less than 5% p.a. after Management Fees, Administration Fees and Performance Fees, denominated in USD

Strategy: We add value via active asset-selection using a range of valuation models with the aim of delivering superior risk-adjusted returns, or alpha, to traditional hedge funds. The USD Investor Class has exposure to an Underlying Pool (the **Fund**) which invests primarily in senior and subordinated debt securities, hybrids and derivatives issued by Australian entities domestically, although we can invest in these securities when they are issued overseas, or by overseas entities (into Australia or offshore). The Fund can use gearing and targets holding the majority of its portfolio in investment-grade securities. The Fund returns are hedged to USD. The fund is managed by Coolabah Capital Investments.


LSCF USD Investor Class vs Benchmark						
Period Ending 31/08/2020	Gross Return (USD)	Net Return (USD)†	Gross Return (Insto)*	Net Return (Insto)*	Fed Funds Target Range Midpoint	Gross USD Excess Return‡
1 month	0.88%	0.65%	0.90%	0.68%	0.01%	0.87%
3 months	4.02%	3.31%	4.06%	3.10%	0.03%	3.99%
6 months	4.18%	3.20%	3.55%	2.44%	0.06%	4.12%
1 year	7.36%	5.56%	5.54%	3.70%	0.89%	6.47%
2 years pa	8.27%	6.31%	6.66%	4.67%	1.58%	6.70%
3 years pa	7.64%	5.79%	6.38%	4.49%	1.55%	6.09%
Inception pa Aug. 2017	7.64%	5.79%	6.38%	4.49%	1.55%	6.09%

*The Institutional unit class return is in AUD. † Net returns are calculated from the historic gross returns using the current fee structure as displayed in the Product Disclosure Statement. ‡ The Excess Return columns represent the gross and net return above the midpoint of the US Federal Funds Target Range.

Long Short Credit (USD Denominated) Net Monthly Returns

Since Inception Aug. 2017

Source: Bloomberg; Coolabah Capital Investments




*returns are hedged to USD using 1m forward contracts

Long Short Credit (USD Denominated) Net Monthly Returns

August 2020

Source: Bloomberg; Coolabah Capital Investments



*returns are hedged to USD using 1m forward contracts

Disclaimer: Past performance does not assure future returns. Returns are shown net of all Management and Performance fees unless otherwise stated. All investments carry risks, including that the value of investments may vary, future returns may differ from past returns, and that your capital is not guaranteed. To understand Fund's risks better, please refer to the Product Disclosure Statement available at Coolabah Capital Investments' [website](#).



Portfolio Weight Cash Securities	3.4%	Cash Securities + RBA Repo-Eligible Debt	35.5%
Portfolio Weight Floating-Rate Securities	96.1%	Portfolio Weight Hybrids	21.9%
Av. Portfolio Credit Rating	A	Portfolio Weight ABS/RMBS	15.2%
No. Floating-Rate Notes/Bonds/Hybrids	76	Credit Spread Duration	3.80 years
Total Number of Unique ADIs	13	Annual Volatility (since incep.)	4.78% p.a.
Av. Gross Running Yield (Net of leverage)	3.27%	Gross Sharpe Ratio (since incep.)	1.6x
Modified Interest Rate Duration	0.20 years	Permitted Gearing	Up to 75%

The above characteristics refer to the characteristics of the Underlying Pool (the Fund) and do not include currency hedging.


Past performance does not assure future returns. Please read the PDS to understand risks and disclaimers on final page

www.coolabahcapital.com

ALPHA MANAGER 2019
 Christopher Joye

LSCF Portfolio Weights: Cash Securities + RBA Repurchase Eligible Debt
 End of Month, August 2020

Long Short Credit Fund Portfolio Composition:
 31 August 2020


Compositions are for the underlying portfolio and do not include currency hedging


Long Short Credit (USD) Gross Monthly Returns vs Benchmarks
 Since Inception


The since inception gross (net) return of 7.64% (5.79%) is the total return earned by the fund since 31 Aug 2017, including interest income and movements in the price of the bond portfolio after all fund fees paid by institutional investors, estimated with a hedge to USD using 1 month forward contracts. Each investor's return will vary depending on their fee regime, investment date, and any top-ups/withdrawals they make. The annualised volatility estimate of 4.78% p.a. is based on the standard deviation of net monthly returns since inception, which are then annualised.

Portfolio Managers	Christopher Joye, Ashley Kabel, Stephen Parker, Darren Harvey (Coolabah Capital Investments)		
APIR Code (USD Investor)	ETL7843AU	Fund Inception	31-Aug-17
ISIN	AU60ETL78432	Distributions	Quarterly
ARSN	617 838 543	Unit Pricing	Daily (earnings accrue daily)
Asset-Class	Alternatives/Hedge Funds	Min. Investment	US\$1,000
Investment Manager	Smarter Money Investments	Withdrawals	Daily Requests (funds normally in 5 days)
Sub-Manager	Coolabah Capital Investments	Buy/Sell Spread	0.00%/0.10%
Responsible Entity	Equity Trustees	Mgt. Fee	0.50% p.a.
Custodian	Mainstream Fund Services	Admin. Fee	0.25% p.a.
Target Return	Net 4.0%-6.0% > US Fed Funds Target Range Mid Point	Perf. Fee	20.5% of returns over US Federal Funds Target Range Midpoint plus Management & Admin Fees

*In the commentary below, returns indicated with * are in AUD hedged to USD with 1m forward contracts. All other returns are USD Denominated*

Portfolio commentary: The daily liquidity and zero-duration Long Short Credit Fund (LSCF) USD Investor Class strategy returned **0.88% gross (0.65% net of fees)** in August. The fund once again substantially outperforming the benchmark **US Fed Funds Target Range Midpoint (0.01%)**, the **AusBond Bank Bill Index* (0.12%)**, the **AusBond FRN Index* (0.21%)**, and the **FE Fundinfo Alternative Index* (0.68%)**. This alpha was fuelled by ongoing mean-reversion in credit spreads on assets that Coolabah had acquired during the COVID-19 shock, which have started normalising back towards their pre-crisis levels. **The fund ended August with a weighted-average credit rating of A, and a running yield of 3.27%.** Over the previous 3 months, the fund has returned **4.02% gross (3.31% net)**, compared to the target **US Fed Funds Target Range Midpoint (0.03%)**, the **AusBond Bank Bills Index* (0.45%)**, the **AusBond FRN Index* (1.18%)**, and the **FE Fundinfo Alternative Index* (3.07%)**.

Since inception of the fund in 2017, using AUD returns hedged to USD before inception of the USD denominated unit class in Feb 2020, it has returned **7.64% gross (5.79% net of fees)** compared to the benchmark **US Fed Funds Target Range Midpoint (1.55%)**, the **AusBond Bank Bills Index* (2.89%)**, the **FE FundInfo Alternative Index* (3.76%)**, the **AusBond FRN Index* (3.91%)**, and the **Barclays High Yield Index (3.94%)**. While return volatility since inception has been around 4.78% pa (measured using monthly returns), as a daily liquidity product with assets that are marked-to-market using executable prices, volatility does exist. This contrasts with illiquid credit (eg, loans and high yield bonds) wherein assets that have very high risk can appear to have remarkably low volatility, which is, in fact, just a mirage explained by the inability to properly value these assets using executable prices.

Strategy commentary: August was another strong month for Coolabah's high liquidity and zero interest rate duration alpha generation with all strategies reporting robust returns and outperforming their benchmarks. This was pleasing in the context of a material jump in long-term interest rates on the back of the US Federal Reserve announcing that it would revise its monetary policy framework to allow for sustained periods of inflation running above its official 2% target to make-up for past misses. Coolabah's CIO wrote about this at length, which [you can read here for free via Livewire](#).

As central banks ramp-up money printing to fund ballooning fiscal deficits that could not be serviced without this "debt monetisation" support, the world moves one step closer to the debasement of fiat currencies as a medium of exchange and a new regime characterised by higher inflation.

Since the GFC, Coolabah has argued that the "QE to infinity" paradigm would end in a protracted period of elevated consumer price inflation as nation states opted for the easy path of seeking to inflate their way out of their fixed nominal debts. With the double-whammy of a 1-in-100 year pandemic that has necessitated extreme fiscal spending that has further undermined credit metrics that were already poor as a result of the GFC, nation states now have no choice but to coerce their central banks to finance these costs. The latest incarnation of this impulse is the "modern monetary theory" (MMT) fad.

The alternative would be a huge increase in government bond yields that would make debt servicing problematic for many countries and ultimately propagate sovereign debt crises. What this means is that increasingly non-independent central banks will be subjugated to the myopic and populist political imperatives of the day, which are defined by the idea that more debt and public spending are a solution to every problem. This logic is in turn motivated by policymakers' belief that all recessions are an inherently bad thing that must be eliminated at almost any cost (and any output losses recovered). The days of credible actors arguing for austerity are long gone.

The contrary perspective that creative destruction is an essential element of freely-functioning markets—and capitalism more generally—appears to hold no sway today. Put differently, central banks are aggressively buying an unprecedented range of privately traded assets because they are trying to thwart price signals that are telling us that bad businesses need to be replaced by more productive concerns. The politicians want to keep unprofitable and [highly leveraged zombie companies](#) alive and completely eliminate the volatility that is inherent in the business cycle that is characteristic of any dynamic, market-orientated economy.

Strategy commentary cont'd: What does this mean for portfolio construction? As we've argued for years, investors need to build portfolios that can continue to perform during periods of high inflation. The last 100 years of data shows fairly convincingly that interest rate duration as an equities hedge tends to only work during deflationary shocks. In periods of high inflation, duration becomes positively, not negatively, correlated with equities.

In the month of August, Coolabah's institutional daily liquidity, zero duration long/short credit strategies were up by between 90 and 109 basis points (bps) before fees depending on the solution. The AusBond Floating-Rate Note Index returned 10bps in August, ahead of the RBA cash rate's 2bps return and the miserly 1bps offered by the AusBond Bank Bill Index. As yields increased, the AusBond Composite Bond Index struggled, dropping by 42bps.

A stand-out in August was the ASX hybrid market, with the market-wide index returning 83bps in August before franking credits as the credit spread on five-year major bank hybrids compressed to about 323bps above the bank bill swap rate (generating capital gains as prices climbed). While this accords with Coolabah's expectations for ongoing mean-reversion in hybrid spreads, it is still well wide of the pre-COVID-19 level of around 275bps and recent 2019 tightness of circa 260bps. The hybrid market should offer some attractive new primary supply opportunities with the likes of NAB, Challenger, Bendigo and Bank of Queensland all expected to issue new securities in 2020 to refinance maturities.

NAB's landmark unlisted hybrid security has continued to perform well, further compressing in credit spread terms from its 400bps initial margin to about 365bps at the time of writing. (Coolabah was a cornerstone investor in this transaction.)

Another driver of returns in August was the subordinated bond market, which has in recent months become a key active position for Coolabah. The credit spread on five-year major bank Tier 2 bonds contracted from 201bps at the end of July to 178bps by end August despite a torrent of new supply. In the final two weeks of the month there were no less than five different Tier 2 issues from IAG, QBE, ANZ, Suncorp and CBA. NAB also issued in US dollars. Coolabah participated in all save NAB and QBE, both of which struggled post issue.

One laggard in August was the major banks' senior bonds, which Coolabah had exited in July. The spread on five-year senior bonds actually increased from 42bps to 47bps over the month as bank balance-sheets sought to take profits into a bid that was weak to say the least.

Following the end of the month the RBA announced it would further expand its important Term Funding Facility, which will now be increased by \$57 billion to provide three-year funding of up to \$200 billion to all Australian banks at a cost of just 0.25% annually. This is allowing banks to avoid having to issue more expensive senior bonds to replace their existing maturities in Australia and overseas. It will also put more pressure on savings and deposit rates as the banks can access cheaper and longer-term funding via the RBA.

The net result will be an amplification of the search for yield dynamic, both by investors and bank balance-sheets themselves. Banks have to pledge collateral to draw-down on the TFF, and they will ideally want to find liquid, high-grade assets that pay attractive spreads above government bonds and which are eligible collateral under the RBA's repo facilities. This has been one driver of demand for higher-yielding semi (or state) government bonds, which is another active position Coolabah has accumulated in recent times.

Turning to some of the key risks to the outlook, the Victorian COVID-19 trajectory is tracking nicely in line with Coolabah's projections, which were originally published in early July and forecast a late July peak (the ultimate peak in the Victorian second wave was 31 July). You can [read Coolabah's forecasts for free here](#). The risk now is with other second waves emerging across the Australian continent, although this is not our central case. Our heterodox view remains that effective vaccines will emerge this year, and start public distribution initially to emergency service professionals before the end of 2020 with mass-market roll-outs commencing by the end of the first quarter in 2021. The lingering risks to this perspective concern the safety of the Moderna and Oxford vaccines, the longevity of their efficacy, and what proportion of users they actually protect.

Strategy commentary cont'd: Another worry for many has been the Australian housing market. Since March Coolabah has held the contrarian view that the market would surprise with its resilience with national prices only falling by between 0% and negative 5%. While this projection did not account for the surprising Victorian second wave, the market is behaving as expected. Auction clearance rates in Sydney have been very strong, and improving in recent weeks. More significantly, the daily hedonic house price indices published by CoreLogic indicate that the Sydney, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide markets may now be starting to recover with a reduction in the rate of house price declines in August and outright stability in many cities (eg, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth). Nationally across the eight capital cities, home values have only fallen by 2.5% from their April 2020 peak. Coolabah expects the house price boom that began in June 2019 to reassert itself by the first quarter of next year.

One significant concern relates to record unofficial arrears in illiquid and subordinated bonds comprising “securitised” portfolios of Australian home loans, SME loans and consumer loans that are packaged up and sold to investors through residential mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities.

Coolabah is particularly anxious about RMBS and ABS issued by non-bank lenders that are not actively supervised by Australia’s tough banking regulator, which mandates minimum lending standards for deposit-takers.

Non-banks typically target borrowers who cannot get finance from normal banks, which often means consumers with higher default risks. If around 10% of all bank borrowers have been forced on to loan repayment holidays, it is reasonable to assume that non-banks will be suffering from similar, if not worse, arrears.

At the peak of the US sub-prime crisis, the 90-day default rate on very low quality US home loans hit about 10% of all borrowers, which is disturbingly similar to where the unofficial Australian default rate is right now if you included borrowers not making repayments.

These repayment holidays are not being recorded as arrears (or defaults), but the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority has said lenders will have to do so by the end of their deferral periods.

Our analysis indicates that this means that RMBS and ABS arrears should start spiking in March and April next year. (Technically, under an Australian mortgage agreement, once you miss a repayment you are legally in default, although banks rarely exercise their rights until you have missed many months of payments.)

Most RMBS/ABS bonds have “step-down” provisions that mean if the reported 60 days arrears rate climbs beyond a threshold (normally 4%), the lower-ranking, or junior, bonds will stop receiving repayments of principal from their borrowers (they only receive interest), with these cash flows diverted to the highest-ranking, or senior, bonds.

(An ABS or RMBS issue is normally broken up into three to six different bonds delineated by their ranking and entitlement to the cash flows paid on the loans.)

This means that the expected life of the subordinated bonds could blow out as principal repayments are deferred. Among other things, this could reduce both the liquidity and price of these RMBS and ABS securities.

Similar risks apply to the warehouse facilities that are extended to non-banks prior to securitising a loan portfolio via the sale of RMBS and ABS. Coupled with the soft housing market, it does not make for a comforting picture.



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