



**March 2026**


**Objective:** An independently-rated/recommended strategy targeting low-risk cash and fixed-income returns that exceed the RBA's cash rate by 1%-2% pa after fees, over rolling 12 month periods.

**Strategy:** We actively invest in a diversified portfolio of Australian deposits and investment grade floating-rate notes with a weighted-average "A" credit rating. We do not invest in fixed-rate bonds (unless interest rate risk is hedged), sub-investment grade bonds, direct loans, equities, capital notes, preference shares (eg, hybrids), use leverage, or take currency risk. We add value via active asset-selection using a range of valuation models with the aim of (1) delivering lower portfolio volatility than traditional bond funds and (2) providing superior risk-adjusted returns, or alpha, without explicitly seeking interest rate risk, credit risk or liquidity risk. The strategy is managed by Coolabah Capital Investments, which is a specialist active credit manager.

Period Ending 2026-03-31	Gross Return (Base)	Net Return (Base) <sup>†</sup>	RBA Cash Rate	Gross Excess Return <sup>‡</sup>	Net Excess Return (Assist.) <sup>†‡</sup>
1 month	0.19%	0.12%	0.34%	-0.15%	-0.23%
3 months	0.95%	0.74%	0.92%	0.02%	-0.18%
6 months	2.09%	1.68%	1.83%	0.27%	-0.14%
1 year	5.14%	4.31%	3.77%	1.37%	0.54%
<b>3 years pa</b>	<b>6.37%</b>	<b>5.53%</b>	<b>4.06%</b>	<b>2.31%</b>	<b>1.48%</b>
5 years pa	4.25%	3.43%	2.84%	1.42%	0.60%
10 years pa	3.94%	3.12%	1.98%	1.96%	1.14%
<b>Inception pa Feb. 2012</b>	<b>4.37%</b>	<b>3.55%</b>	<b>2.18%</b>	<b>2.19%</b>	<b>1.37%</b>


**Smarter Money Fund Returns (Net) vs Comparisons**

Annualized Total Returns Since Inception in February 2012 to March 2026



**Annual Running Yield**

31 March 2026



<sup>†</sup> Net returns are calculated from the historic gross returns using the current fee structure as displayed in the Product Disclosure Statement. <sup>‡</sup> The Excess Return columns represent the gross and net return above the RBA cash rate.

**Disclaimer:** Past performance does not assure future returns. Returns and yields are shown net of management fees and costs unless otherwise stated. All investments carry risks, including that the value of investments may vary, future returns may differ from past returns, and that your capital is not guaranteed. To understand Fund's risks better, please refer to the Product Disclosure Statement available at Coolabah Capital Investments' website.

Net Monthly Returns > RBA Overnight Cash Rate	75%	Av. Interest Rate (Gross Running Yield)	4.97%
Portfolio Weight to Cash Accounts	10.5%	Modified Interest Rate Duration	0.13 years
Portfolio Weight to Bonds	88.9%	Gearing Permitted?	No
Av. Portfolio Credit Rating	AA-	1 Year Av. Portfolio Weight to Cash	10.2%
Portfolio MSCI ESG Rating	AA	Cash Accounts + RBA Repo-Eligible Debt	71.1%
No. Cash Accounts	12	Net Annual Volatility (since incep.)	0.59%
No. Notes and Bonds	165	Net Sharpe Ratio (since incep.)	2.33x


**Ratings:** Recommended (Zenith); Superior - Relatively Simple (Foresight Analytics)



Asset weighted average rating

**Portfolio Weights: Cash + RBA Repo Eligible Debt**


31 March 2026



Data Source: Coolabah Capital Investments

**Smarter Money Fund Portfolio Composition (NAV)**

31 March 2026




Data Source: Coolabah Capital Investments



**Value of \$100 Invested Since Inception**

31 March 2026



Data Source: Bloomberg, Coolabah Capital Investments

**Disclaimer:** Past performance does not assure future returns. Returns and yields are shown net of management fees and costs unless otherwise stated. All investments carry risks, including that the value of investments may vary, future returns may differ from past returns, and that your capital is not guaranteed. To understand Fund's risks better, please refer to the Product Disclosure Statement available at Coolabah Capital Investments' [website](#).

The since inception gross (net) return of 4.37% pa gross (3.55% pa net) is the total annual return earned by the fund since Feb. 2012, including interest income and movements in the price of the bond portfolio after all fund fees (assuming net returns are calculated from the historic gross returns using the current fee structure as displayed in the Product Disclosure Statement). The net return quoted applies to the Smarter Money Fund - Base Fee Class, with quarterly distributions reinvested. Investment return will vary depending upon investment date and any additional investments and withdrawals made. The annualised volatility estimate of 0.59% pa is based on the standard deviation of net daily returns since inception, which are then annualised, attributable to the Smarter Money Fund - Base Fee Class.

Portfolio Managers Christopher Joye, Ashley Kabel, Roger Douglas, Fionn O'Leary (Coolabah Capital Investments)

APIR Code	ETL6313AU	Fund Inception	17-Feb-12
mFund Code	-	Distributions	Quarterly
Asset-Class	Smarter Money/Short-Term Fixed-Interest	Unit Pricing	Daily (earnings accrue daily)
Target Return	Net 1-2% pa over RBA cash rate	Min. Investment	\$1,000
Investment Manager	Coolabah Capital Investments (Retail)	Withdrawals	Daily Requests (funds normally in 3 days)
Responsible Entity	Equity Trustees	Buy/Sell Spread	0.00%/0.025%
Custodian	Citigroup	Mgt. & Admin Fee	0.79% pa

**Portfolio commentary:** In March, the zero-duration daily liquidity Smarter Money Fund (SMF) returned 0.19% gross (0.12% net), compared to the FE Cash Enhanced Index (0.16%), the AusBond Bank Bill Index (0.32%), the RBA Overnight Cash Rate (0.34%), and the BetaShares High Interest Cash (AAA) ETF (0.35%). Over the previous 3 years, SMF returned 6.37% pa gross (5.53% pa net), outperforming the RBA Overnight Cash Rate (4.06% pa), the AusBond Bank Bill Index (4.14% pa), the BetaShares High Interest Cash (AAA) ETF (4.25% pa), and the FE Cash Enhanced Index (4.56% pa). SMF ended March with a running yield of 4.97% pa, a weighted-average credit rating of AA-, and a portfolio weighted average MSCI ESG rating of AA.

Since the inception of SMF 14.1 years ago in February 2012, it has returned 4.37% pa gross (3.55% pa net), outperforming the RBA Overnight Cash Rate (2.18% pa), the BetaShares High Interest Cash (AAA) ETF (2.23% pa), the AusBond Bank Bill Index (2.36% pa), and the FE Cash Enhanced Index (2.58% pa). Since inception, SMF's Sharpe Ratio, which measures risk-adjusted returns, has been 3.71x gross (2.33x net). While SMF's return volatility since inception has been low at around 0.59% pa (measured using daily returns), as a daily liquidity product with assets that are marked-to-market using executable prices, volatility does exist. This contrasts with illiquid credit (eg, loans and high yield bonds) wherein assets that have very high risk can appear to have remarkably low volatility, which is, in fact, just a mirage explained by the inability to properly value these assets using executable prices.

**Strategy commentary:** Coolabah's performance was resilient in March, with strategies such as the daily-liquidity, AAA-rated, zero-duration Active Sovereign Bond Fund posting healthy positive returns after fees. Coolabah's zero-duration, daily-liquidity, unlevered cash-plus strategies — which typically carry average ratings in the A to AA band — also delivered positive net returns despite the massive sell-off in both equity and long-duration bond markets.

One example was the HBRD ETF, which provided positive net performance even as major bank hybrid indices declined by about 0.25% (unfranked). Even Coolabah's most aggressive levered credit strategies reported resilient performance, supported by improving yields that have been boosted by cash rate increases, which are likely to continue given the current inflation crisis.

March was defined by the escalation of the US-Iran conflict and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which sent a fresh inflation shock through global markets and drove a broad bear-flattening of yield curves. Brent crude surged 63.3% over the month to US\$118.35/bbl and WTI rose 51.3% to US\$101.38/bbl, while natural gas was also up 59%. Brent's intraday spike to US\$119.50 on 9 March before collapsing to as low as US\$83.66 was one of the largest oil price swings in decades.

That inflation pulse forced investors to rapidly reprice monetary policy projections, with expectations for 2026 Federal Reserve easing erased and ECB pricing shifting from cuts to hikes. Benchmark 10-year government bond yields moved sharply higher across major markets, rising 68bps in UK gilts, 64bps in Italy, 51bps in French OATs, 38bps in US Treasuries, 36bps in Bunds and 24bps in JGBs. Peripheral stress also widened the OAT/Bund spread by 14.4bps and the BTP/Bund spread by 27.5bps.

The sharp increase in government bond yields significantly hurt the performance of long-duration bond indices. The Bloomberg Global Aggregate Corporate Index declined by 2.08% in AUD terms, 2.05% in GBP terms, and 1.99% in USD terms over March.

Credit markets weakened, with Europe clearly underperforming. US investment-grade spreads widened only 5bps to 89bps, whereas EUR Agg Corp spreads widened 15bps to 97bps, iTraxx Main moved 15.9bps wider, Xover (a high-yield proxy) blew out 92.5bps, and senior financial spreads widened 18.7bps.

Global private credit markets faced notable stress during the month. Major fund managers experienced elevated redemption pressures, while expectations for rising default rates increased. These challenges are likely to be amplified by the potential shift toward central bank hiking cycles instead of easing, which would raise funding costs and place further pressure on leveraged borrowers. As capital exits this sector en masse, global private credit funds will no longer be able to "extend and pretend" as they have done for a long time, kicking the can down the road. This credit rationing will likely precipitate a monster private credit default cycle, which will be the worst since the 2008 crisis.

**Strategy commentary cont'd:** Risk assets sold off heavily as stagflation fears intensified. The S&P 500 fell 5.0% on a total return basis, the Nasdaq declined 4.8%, the Euro Stoxx 50 dropped 9.1%, Euro Stoxx banks fell 10.8%, the FTSE 100 declined 6.2% and the Nikkei 225 plunged 12.7%. Gold fell 11.6%, silver was down 20%, and one of the few assets to finish higher was Bitcoin, which rose 4.1%.

Foreign exchange also reflected the risk-off tone and stronger US dollar, with EUR/USD down 2.2%, AUD/USD down 3.1%, NZD/USD down 4.2% and USD/JPY up 1.7%.

Despite the volatility, the US primary market remained open and active, with US\$242bn of investment-grade issuance in March (only 28% from financials), including Amazon and Salesforce alone issuing US\$62.5bn. Europe was quieter at €56bn, with financials contributing just €8bn and average new issue premiums in financials around 7bps.

Australia saw just A\$3.3bn of primary AUD investment-grade supply, the lightest month since April last year, leaving year-to-date issuance at about A\$53bn versus roughly A\$56bn at the same point last year. All seven deals were non-bank and generally small.

Coolabah remained highly selective in primary markets, participating in NBN's 10-year Aa3 senior issue, which drew A\$2.25bn of demand for an A\$850m print, and NAB's AAA RMBS transaction, where the A1 class attracted A\$2.7bn of demand for A\$1.6bn of issuance.

In contrast, Verizon's hybrid deal appeared weak and moved 15-20bps wider after pricing. Semi-government issuers including TCV, QTC, AUSCAP, SAFA and NSWTC also used windows of stability to issue across the 5.5- to 10-year part of the curve.

In Australia, the RBA lifted the cash rate by 25bps to 4.1% on 17 March, with the market pushing the terminal rate towards 5%. This will create problems for marginal borrowers in interest-rate-sensitive sectors such as commercial property and residential real estate development. Australian house prices are now likely to start falling later this year.

Australian 10-year government yields rose 32bps to 4.97%, while New Zealand 10-year yields rose 41bps to 4.55%. Major bank senior, subordinated and hybrid spreads widened by 4.4bps, 11.7bps and 8.1bps respectively, and the AUD iTraxx index widened 24bps to 92.1bps. Duration-heavy domestic benchmarks reflected these moves, with the AusBond Credit Index falling 1.15% and the AusBond Composite Index declining 1.42%, while the floating-rate AusBond Credit FRN Index still gained 0.25%.

Equity markets also fell sharply locally, with the ASX 200 down 7.8% on price and 7.15% on a total return basis, while the NZX 50 declined 6.7% on price and 5.91% on total return.

Coolabah's standout performer in March was the daily-liquidity, AAA-rated Active Sovereign Bond Fund (Zero Duration), which delivered 0.47% gross and 0.40% net return in a month when the AusBond Treasury Index fell 1.36%, highlighting the value of eliminating duration risk while sovereign yields were rising sharply.

Other strategies that finished the month in positive territory included the Smarter Money Higher Income range at roughly 0.10% to 0.19% net, the Smarter Money Fund at approximately 0.12% to 0.19% net, and HBRD, which still generated a modest positive return of around 0.04% to 0.06% net (unfranked and franked) despite major bank hybrid indices losing 0.25% unfranked.


Even our most aggressive levered strategies furnished resilient performance relative to equities, high yield bonds, private credit, and long-duration indices. This included the zero-duration, daily-liquidity, A+-rated Long Short Credit Fund (down only 0.10% to 0.19% net) and YLDX ETF (off 0.21% to 0.22% net), which benefited from the rising cash rate and running yields.

This compares favourably with the Bloomberg Global High Yield Index loss of 2.47% (in USD), Global Aggregate Corporate losses of about 2.08% (AUD), the Bloomberg Global Aggregate Credit USD Unhedged index decline of around 3.02%, the AusBond Composite Index fall of 1.42%, and equity markets that declined between 5% and 13% globally and 7.30% on the All Ords Accumulation Index.

**Strategy commentary cont'd:** Global private credit markets experienced severe turmoil. Publicly traded Business Development Companies (BDCs) in the US — a listed proxy for private debt — endured a volatile and sustained contraction in March. Benchmark price returns slid as indices such as the S&P BDC Index dropped over 3% during peak mid-month sell-offs. This acute downward pressure was fuelled by a turbulent macroeconomic backdrop of rising interest rates, widening credit spreads, and soft sequential earnings reports, which collectively triggered a severe valuation penalty across the sector. Consequently, the rapid deterioration in share prices significantly outpaced underlying asset markdowns, widening the sector's average price-to-Net Tangible Asset (NTA) discount: the CWBDC index discount moved from around 16–17% in late February/early March to -22.07% by March 31. The median BDC traded closer to a 26–28% discount (0.72–0.74x price-to-NAV) by late in the month.

The income backdrop remains compelling and supportive for liquid, high-grade bond strategies that have little-to-no underlying default risks.

Within Coolabah's portfolio, the Long Short Opportunities Fund has the highest annual gross running yields at approximately 6.9%, followed by the Floating-Rate High Yield Fund (6.8%), the Global Carbon Leaders Fund (6.7%), YLDX and the Active Global Bond Fund (6.4%), the Long Short Credit Fund (6.2%), HBRD and FIXD (5.8%), and the Short Term Income Fund (5.1%). Importantly, these yields are generally being delivered with daily liquidity, average portfolio ratings ranging from A to AA, and — outside the dedicated long-duration index-tracking strategies — little-to-no interest rate duration risk.



Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. The value of investments can rise and fall, and investors may not get back the full amount invested. Returns are not guaranteed. This information is general in nature only and does not constitute financial, investment, tax or legal advice. It does not take into account your personal objectives, financial situation or needs.

**The state of play with the energy price shock**

Past energy supply shocks have seen central banks cut rates modestly as they balance higher inflation and higher unemployment, although at present interest rate markets are more worried about inflation. Shipping volumes through the Strait of Hormuz are still very low, where there is the risk that US and Israeli bombing damages Iranian oil production, which accounts for 5% of global output. Prices of key energy and industrial commodities have surged in line past supply shocks. Higher energy prices should be immediately reflected in higher headline inflation, with an additional boost likely from food prices. The impact on core inflation should be modest, unless inflation expectations increase, as happened in the 1970s, leading to much higher interest rates.



Asset weighted average rating

**Strategy commentary cont'd:** Depending on its duration, the current energy supply shock will be a drag on world output mainly from Q2 onwards via fuel shortages and higher prices curbing demand:


1. The greatly reduced supply of key commodities acts as a drag on production, especially for the transport sector, depending on the duration of the shock and when existing inventories are exhausted.
2. Higher prices effectively act as a more immediate "tax" on spending and investment unless governments cap prices and/or provide financial assistance to offset the cost.

Quantifying the first effect is very difficult because reliable world data on the production of energy are only made publicly available with a long lag, but fuel shortages are emerging in Asia, which is highly dependent on exports from the Gulf. In contrast, energy prices are readily observable, although widely-quoted futures prices understate the recent rise in spot prices.

Economies have become much more fuel efficient since the 1970s, but growth in world energy production is still correlated with growth in world GDP, and this shock is unusual in that the supply of a wide range of key commodities has been affected.

Note that in terms of the two effects, the US is an outlier among the advanced economies in that it is the world's largest producer of oil, exporting the excess to the rest of the world, although US GDP is still affected by the second channel.

**Figure 1: In a sustained shock, fuel shortages will act as a drag on output when inventories are exhausted, while higher prices will curb demand, even in the US, which is the largest global producer of oil**



Source: Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Energy Institute, International Energy Agency, Coolabah Capital Investments


The duration of the shock remains unknown, although equity prices appear to be factoring in a relatively short shock, while rates markets are more worried about the risks to inflation.

The latter is reflected in rates markets either pricing out expected rate cuts, switching from pricing in rate cuts to pricing in rate hikes, or, in the unique example of Australia, pricing in additional tightening.

Past energy shocks have usually seen central banks cut interest rates as the balance higher inflation and higher unemployment, although not by much. This time differs from earlier episodes in that interest rates are not at a high starting point and risks around inflation and inflation expectations are greater in that central banks have not returned inflation to target.


Strategy commentary cont'd:

Figure 2: Interest rate markets appear more concerned about the risks to inflation as they price out rate cuts and, in some cases, price in rate hikes (or additional tightening in the case of Australia) ...



Source: Bloomberg, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, European Central Bank, Reserve Bank of Australia, Coolabah Capital Investments

Figure 3: ... whereas in past shocks central banks have tended to cut rates modestly as they balance higher inflation and higher unemployment



Source: International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Coolabah Capital Investments


Notwithstanding the uncertainty about the duration of the shock, there has been some positive news about the supply of commodities from the Gulf, in that the number of ships exiting the Strait of Hormuz has picked up lately (Iran is permitting some ships to exit the Gulf, sometimes charging tolls). However, estimated shipping volumes are still very low.

In terms of risks to supply, the pace of recovery in shipping volumes will depend on whether Iran continues to restrict traffic, as well as the time it takes to repair damaged production facilities in the region. If Iran successfully imposes a toll on traffic, shipping volumes would presumably recover more quickly at a higher end-cost to the Gulf's trading partners, most of whom are in Asia.

Also on risks to supply, if the US and Israel bomb Iranian infrastructure past Tuesday's 8pm ET deadline, Iran's oil production – which accounts for about 5% of world output – could be out of action for an extended period.

Strategy commentary cont'd:

Figure 4: Encouragingly, the number of ships exiting the Gulf has picked up lately, but estimated shipping volumes are still very low




Source: International Monetary Fund, Coolabah Capital Investments

As for key commodity prices, the increase over March and April to date has been:


- The world price of oil c.65%;
- The world price of gas c.30%;
- The US price of jet fuel c.95%;
- The benchmark Ukrainian price of urea, a key fertiliser c.75%;
- The benchmark Australian price of coal c.15%; and
- The US price of diesel c.35%.

As shown in the charts below, these massive price rises are similar to the increases seen in past oil price shocks in inflation-adjusted terms, except for thermal coal, which is not directly affected by the war, serving as a substitute in the generation of electricity.

Figure 5: Key energy and commodity prices have surged in line with past supply shocks\*



**Strategy commentary cont'd:**




Note: \* Coal is not directly affected by the war and is a substitute in the production of electricity.  
 Source: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, International Monetary Fund, U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Bank, Coolabah Capital Investments

While energy prices have a large and immediate effect on headline inflation, subject to any government retail price caps/subsidies, the spike in fertiliser prices will have an additional impact on food prices, adding to the boost from higher transport costs and the effects of a potential El Nino.

Modelling shows that energy prices tend to have a small impact on core inflation, although central banks will be worried about the possibility that high headline inflation feeds into inflation expectations given the broad nature of this shock and with inflation yet to return to target on a sustainable basis.


**Figure 6: Food prices are likely to rise sharply given the spike in the price of fertiliser and higher transport costs**



Source: World Bank, Coolabah Capital Investments

Finally, it is worth remembering that futures prices – which are widely used to forecast commodity prices – unfortunately have a poor track record of prediction, even in normal times. The same holds true for surveys of commodity analysts and investors.

Strategy commentary cont'd:



**The risk of higher US interest rates**

The Fed's Open Market Committee has left the range for the funds rate unchanged at 3.5-3.75% for the second meeting in a row, where there was one vote in favour of a rate cut (in January, there were two votes in favour of a cut).

CCI's policy rules – which key off the Fed's economic outlook and rely on a range of estimates of both the neutral funds rate and the NAIRU – continue to suggest that the funds rate should be held steady at a higher rate of about 4%.

The policy rules point to a higher funds rate because core inflation is still well above the Fed's 2% target, while most estimates of the neutral policy rate are higher than the median FOMC estimate of about 3%. This is despite the evidence of some slack in the labour market, where employment has barely grown for a long time and the unemployment rate is slightly above estimates of the NAIRU.

Officially, the Fed has a different view in that the FOMC's updated outlook still has a median forecast of one rate cut this year and another one next year, the same as expected in December. This trajectory largely reflects the view that inflation will ease once the impact of tariffs starts to fade around the middle of the year, as well as ongoing concern about the low rate of hiring in the labour market.

However, the ground looks to be shifting in the face of slower-than-expected progress on inflation and the fresh threat to inflation expectations posed by the Iran war.

Asked whether some FOMC members had again wanted the Fed to provide "two-sided guidance" on policy – which is just an awkward way of saying the next move in rates might be a cut or it might be a hike – Powell said:

***"[T]he possibility that our next move might be an increase did come up at the meeting, as it did the last meeting. The vast majority of participants don't see that as their base case, [but], of course, we don't take things off the table. But you correctly characterised ... what was in the [January] minutes, that several participants indicated something very much like that conversation did happen."***


As for the Iran war, Chair Powell was very careful to highlight the extreme uncertainty around the duration of the conflict and its impact on prices and consumers ("Like everybody else, we have to wait and see what happens ... [and] I really wouldn't speculate").

However, Powell spelled out that while the "longstanding [central bank] thinking is that you do look through energy shocks", this was "conditioned on inflation expectations [remaining stable]", adding that the fact that inflation had been above target for five years was a factor in the FOMC's decision-making.

**Strategy commentary cont'd:** Inflation expectations have been remarkably stable for many years, shrugging off both the long period of low inflation after the global financial crisis and the sustained high inflation of the pandemic, but all central banks are acutely aware of how the large sustained energy shocks of the 1970s fed into higher inflation expectations, underpinning a disastrous mix of high inflation, high unemployment, and high interest rates.


Finally, while this was ostensibly Powell's penultimate meeting as Fed Chair, he indicated he might need to stay in the role past the expected handover to former Fed governor Warsh in mid May if the Senate had not confirmed Warsh by that time, pointedly adding that, "I have no intention of leaving the board until the [Department of Justice] investigation [into him and the Fed] is well and truly over with transparency and finality". He went on to say, "on the question of whether I will serve as a governor after my term ends and the investigation is over, I have not made that decision yet. I will make that decision based on what I think is best for the institution and for the people we serve."

**Figure 1: There was no change to the FOMC's point forecasts for a couple of rate cuts over the next two years, although Fed Chair Powell's press conference suggested the FOMC's view on policy is shifting**



Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Coolabah Capital Investments

**Figure 2: A simple policy rule suggests that US interest rates should be higher**



Note: The ECB cut the main refinancing rate by 60bp in September 2024, comprising a 25bp monetary policy cut and 35bp related to a change in how policy is implemented. The rules are based on a range of estimates for both the NAIRU and the neutral policy rate.  
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Richmond and St Louis, Reserve Bank of Australia, Coolabah Capital Investments



Don't forget to listen to Coolabah Capital's popular Complexity Premia podcast. You can listen on your favourite podcast app, or you can find it on [Apple Podcasts](#) or [Podbean](#).

**Performance Disclaimer:**

Past performance does not assure future returns. All investments carry risks, including that the value of investments may vary, future returns may differ from past returns, and that your capital is not guaranteed. This information has been prepared by Coolabah Capital Investments (Retail) Pty Limited ACN 153 555 867. It is general information only and is not intended to provide you with financial advice. You should not rely on any information herein in making any investment decisions. To the extent permitted by law, no liability is accepted for any loss or damage as a result of any reliance on this information. The Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) and Target Market Determination (TMD) for the funds should be considered before deciding whether to acquire or hold units in it. A PDS and TMD for these products can be obtained by visiting [www.coolabahcapital.com](http://www.coolabahcapital.com). Neither Coolabah Capital Investments (Retail) Pty Limited, Equity Trustees Limited nor their respective shareholders, directors and associated businesses assume any liability to investors in connection with any investment in the funds, or guarantees the performance of any obligations to investors, the performance of the funds or any particular rate of return. The repayment of capital is not guaranteed. Investments in the funds are not deposits or liabilities of any of the above-mentioned parties, nor of any Authorised Deposit-taking Institution. The funds are subject to investment risks, which could include delays in repayment and/or loss of income and capital invested. Past performance is not an indicator of nor assures any future returns or risks. Coolabah Capital Investments (Retail) Pty Limited (ACN 153 555 867) is an authorised representative (#000414337) of Coolabah Capital Institutional Investments Pty Ltd (AFSL 482238). Equity Trustees Ltd (AFSL 240975) is the Responsible Entity for these funds. Equity Trustees Ltd is a subsidiary of EQT Holdings Limited (ACN 607 797 615), a publicly listed company on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX: EQT). A Target Market Determination (TMD) is a document which is required to be made available from 5 October 2021. It describes who this financial product is likely to be appropriate for (i.e. the target market), and any conditions around how the product can be distributed to investors. It also describes the events or circumstances where the Target Market Determination for this financial product may need to be reviewed. The Fund's Target Market Determination is available here' [website](#).

**Ratings Disclaimer:**

Foresight Analytics Disclaimer: The Foresight Analytics, and Foresight Analytics & Ratings logo is used for information purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation or an offer or solicitation to purchase any fund or company securities offered by Coolabah Capital Investments (the manager). Investors should refer to the full disclaimer on the manager's rated funds that can be found at <https://www.foresight-analytics.com/general-disclaimer/>

The Zenith Investment Partners (ABN 27 103 132 672, AFS Licence 226872) ('Zenith') rating (assigned ETL6313AU, ETL8504AU, SLT3458AU, ETL5010AU, ETL9561AU, ETL5578AU, ETL2716AU & FIXD June 2024) referred to in this piece is limited to 'General Advice' (s766B Corporations Act 2001) for Wholesale clients only. This advice has been prepared without taking into account the objectives, financial situation or needs of any individual, including target markets of financial products, where applicable, and is subject to change at any time without prior notice. It is not a specific recommendation to purchase, sell or hold the relevant product(s). Investors should seek independent financial advice before making an investment decision and should consider the appropriateness of this advice in light of their own objectives, financial situation and needs. Investors should obtain a copy of, and consider the PDS or offer document before making any decision and refer to the full Zenith Product Assessment available on the Zenith website. Past performance is not an indication of future performance. Zenith usually charges the product issuer, fund manager or related party to conduct Product Assessments. Full details regarding Zenith's methodology, ratings definitions and regulatory compliance are available on our Product Assessments and at Fund Research Regulatory Guidelines.

MSCI Disclaimer: Neither MSCI nor any other party involved in or related to compiling, computing or creating the MSCI data makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such data (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such data. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, any of its affiliates or any third party involved in or related to compiling, computing or creating the data have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages. No further distribution or dissemination of the MSCI data is permitted without MSCI's express written consent.

